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UNION ELECTIONS UNDER THE LMRDA
CONGRESS enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19591 (LMRDA) primarily "to ensure union democracy,"2 by protecting the
members' rights to participate in the union's election process., Although state
law had provided some protection for these rights, Congress concluded that this
law was inadequate.4 As a result, Title IV r of the Act gives all members in
good standing the right to vote, to nominate candidates, to run for and hold
office, subject only to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed.0 Title IV
also regulates the frequency with which union elections must be conducted,,
requires distribution of campaign literature and access to membership lists,8
and prohibits utilization of union funds to promote individuals' candidacies.0
Title 1 10 provides a general guarantee of "equal rights and privileges within
[the union] to nominate candidates, [and] to vote in elections .... ",,
To enforce these rights and duties Congress provided different remedies for
each Title. If, after the election has been held, a union member alleges a vio-
lation of Title IV, he must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.12 The
1. 73 Stat 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. V, 1964).
2. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
3. "It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic
union elections." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959) ; H.R. RrP. No. 741,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1959). "The Government which gives unions this power has an
obligation to insure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the
men and women whom they represent." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959).
4. In discussing state regulation of union elections, Senator Kennedy said, "I do not
think state law provides adequate remedies in that field." 105 CONG. ec. 6487 (1959).
5. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (Supp. V, 1964). The provisions of Title
IV comprise §§ 401-03 of the LMRDA.
6. 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
7. 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a), (b) (Supp. V, 1964).
8. 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (Supp. V, 1964).
9. 73 Stat 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (Supp. V, 1964).
10. 73 Stat 522-23 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (Supp. V, 1964). The provisions
of Title I comprise §§ 101-05 of the LMRDA.
11. Section 101(a) (1) of the LMRDA. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C, § 411(a) (1)
(Supp. V, 1964). The bill was subsequently enacted as the LMRDA was drafted without
a bill of rights (Title I as enacted). It was during the debate in the Senate that Title I
was superimposed as an afterthought with no effort to reconcile its election provisions
with the other election provisions of the bill. 105 CONG. REc. 6469-93 (1959). The only
guidance for reconciling these two provisions is a statement by Senator Kennedy that
the bill of rights "must be read in conjunction with the rest of the bill." 105 CoNG. lRe.
6720 (1959). For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the bill of rights see
Sherman, The Individual Member and the Union: the Bill of Rights Title in the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 803 (1960) ; see
also the discussion in Mamula v. "United Steelworkers of America, 304 F.2d 108, 110
(3rd Cir. 1962).
12. 73 Stat 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (Supp. V, 1964). The third sentence of
§ 403 states that, "the remedy provided by this title for challenging an election already
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Secretary then must sue in a federal court when there is probable cause to be-
lieve a violation has occurred. 13 The Secretary has no authority to sue before
the election.' 4 The words of Title IV are unclear about whether an individual
union member can obtain any relief before the election. 1' However, if a viola-
tion of Title I is alleged a union member does not have to wait until after the
election, nor does he have to depend on the Labor Department. He can sue for
pre-election relief in a federal district court.16
These titles present extreme difficulties. Not only are the substantive rights
vaguely defined, but the general guarantees of Title I overlap with the more
specific provisions of Title IV.17 This overlap is especially troublesome because
the titles contain different enforcement schemes. These weaknesses in the
statute confront a court when a plaintiff seeks pre-election relief alleging con-
conducted shall be exclusive." 73 Stat 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. V, 1964).
Those federal courts which have been faced with post-election suits brought by individuals
to set aside an election because of a violation of Title IV rights have quickly dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 304 F2d 103 (3rd
Cir. 1962); Gammon v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 433 (N.).
Ga. 1961); Coleman v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 228 F. Supp. 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Myers v. Operating Engineers, 45 L.R.R.ML 3045 (E-D. Mich. 1960).
See also the statement of Stewart, J., concurring in Calhoon v. Harvey that, "as to fed-
eral courts it is certainly arguable that recourse through the Secretary of Labor is the
exclusive remedy only after the election has been held." 379 U.S. 134, 146 (1964).
13. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (Supp. V, 1964).
14. Section 402 of Title IV makes it clear that a union member cannot go to the
Secretary of Labor for pre-election relief. Section 402(c) permits the courts to grant
relief only in suits brought by the Secretary when a violation of § 401 affected the
outcome of an election, or when an election was not held within the time prescribed by
§ 401. Similarly § 402(a) assumes that an election has taken place before the Secretary
may intervene since it provides that the challenged election shall be presumed valid
pending a final decision thereon. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (Supp. V, 1964).
The only two courts which have considered the question of pre-election suits by the
Secretary have concluded that these are not authorized by the statute. Johnson v. San
Diego Waiters & Bartenders Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Jackson v.
National Marine Eng. Ben. Ass'n, 221 F. Supp. 347, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
15. The second sentence of § 403 provides that "existing rights and remedies to en-
force the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to elections prior
to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this title." 73 Stat. 534
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. V, 1964).
16. Section 102 provides, "Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of
this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil
action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as
may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or
where the principal office of such labor organization is located." 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. V, 1964).
17. For a discussion of the overlap between Title I and Title IV substantive rights
see Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 V,. L. Rnv.
195, 224 (1960); see also Daniels, Union Elections and the Landrum-Grilln Act, 13rH
ANN. N.Y.U. Coxr. o LAB oR, 317, 327-30 (1960).
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duct which only arguably violates the vague provisions of Title I, but which
clearly violates the more specific provisions of Title IV. A court could take
jurisdiction to grant relief either by broadly construing the substantive pro-
visions of Title I or by construing the remedial provisions of Title IV to allow
pre-election suits. Conversely, the court could deny jurisdiction by finding that
the plaintiff alleged a violation of Title IV, not Title I, and then by refusing to
find a pre-election remedy in Title IV. The choice between these alternative
procedural decisions largely determines the effectiveness of the Act, since the
second alternative forces the union member to wait until after the election be-
fore he can sue, and leaves him with very little effective protection.
In a recent case, Calhoon v. Harvey,'8 the Supreme Court made exactly this
choice. In Calhoon the bylaws of the defendant local union provided that a
member could nominate only himself for any union office. The constitution of
the national union provided that all nominees for office must have been union
members for at least five years and must have served 180 days or more at sea
on vessels covered by collective bargaining agreements with the national or-
ganization in two of the three years preceding nomination. Nominees for Pres-
ident must have served as a full time paid elected official of an organization
affiliated with the national body. The effect of these provisions was that al-
though every member had the right to nominate, the only nominations which
were effective were those by members who also met the eligibility require-
ments. Plaintiff Harvey, who did not satisfy the requirements, alleged that his
Title I right to "equal rights and privileges... to nominate candidates"' 0I had
been violated. He invoked the jurisdiction of the federal district court under
Title I, and sought to enjoin an impending union election. 20 The district court
dismissed the complaint,21 holding that plaintiff did not allege a Title I viola-
tion, but only a Title IV violation for which there was no pre-election relief.
Following reversal by the Court of Appeals, 22 the Supreme Court reinstated
the District Court's order.2
The majority of the Court refused to consider any of the candidacy require-
ments in determining whether the right to nominate had been infringed.2 4 Once
the majority removed this consideration it held that the self-nominating rule
did not violate Title I, since the self-nominating rule applied equally to all union
members.25 Then the majority held that the Title IV violations alleged could
be remedied only through post-election "administrative and judicial proce-
18. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
19. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1) (Supp. V, 1964); see Brief for Re-
spondent, pp. 19-21, Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
20. See § 102, 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (Supp. V, 1964), conferring juris-
diction.
21. 221 F. Supp. 545, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
22. 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963).
23. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
24. 379 U.S. at 140.
25. 379 U.S. at 139.
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dures."26 Nothing in the language of the Act compelled either holding, and the
majority based its decision on its view that Congress wanted to "utilize the
special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor" in order to pre-
vent individuals from "block[ing] or delay[ing] union elections by filing fed-
eral court suits for violations of Title IV."'
This Note will argue that the Court decided Calhoon wrongly because it was
mistaken in its major premises. First, Congress intended to give only a re-
stricted role to the Secretary of Labor. And second, Congress' main concern
was not with protecting the union against the individual, but with protecting
the individual against the union. In effect the Supreme Court reversed the Con-
gress by giving priority to the union's institutional stability. Not only did the
Court refuse to protect the individual members, but it reduced the protection to
a level lower than before the LMRDA.
Congress gave the Secretary of Labor responsibility in post-election cases
for the limited reasons that he could best consolidate all post-election suits and
supervise re-elections when necessary.2 9 Congress feared that multiple individ-
ual suits would unduly interfere with the union's operation after an election.
Congress also realized that courts could not adequately supervise new elec-
tions.30 None of the functions assigned to the Secretary - investigation, prose-
cution, and supervision of judicial relief - indicate a congressional belief in
his "special knowledge." x31 Nor do they indicate that Congress wanted to de-
26. 379 U.S. at 141. While the complaint in Calhoon only claimed a Title I violation,
it could have been amended under the liberal amendment procedures of the Federal Rules to
include a Title IV claim had the Supreme Court concluded that jurisdiction existed under
Title IV. See, e.g., Stern v. Beer, 200 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Christensson v. Hogdal,
199 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See generally 3 Moomn, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 15.09, at 945
(1964).
27. 379 U.S. at 140.
28. Ibid.
29. However, in the enforcement scheme as set out by Congress the courts were to
have the primary adjudicatory responsibility. Unlike the NLRA the LMRDA does not
permit the Secretary of Labor to adjudicate alleged violations but provides that if the
Secretary finds probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, "he shall . . . bring
a civil action." 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (Supp. V, 1964). Also the LMRDA
gives the Secretary no general rulemaking power which would be applicable to eligibility
cases such as Calhoon. Title IV gives the Secretary the power to make rules and regula-
tions regarding only the removal of officers guilty of serious misconduct. 73 Stat. 533
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(i) (Supp. V, 1964). The courts had already demonstrated in
the pre-statutory law that they were competent in adjudicating union election disputes.
See, e.g., Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 263
App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941); Sibilia v. Western Electric Employees Ass'n, 142
N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d 251 (1948). See generally Summers, Judicial Re.qulaion of Un on
Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221 (1961).
30. See, e.g., statement by Professor Cox, Hearings on S. 505 before the Subcommillee
of Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86t1 Cong., Ist Sess.
119, 133 (1959).
31. The rejection of the NLRB as an administrator of the election provisions of the
LMRDA indicates that expertise was not the dominant criteria. See generally Hearings
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pend on the Secretary's "discretion" in these election cases. 2 And certainly
nothing in the legislative history should have been interpreted to allow these
limited functions of the Secretary to supplant the individual's only effective
relief, relief before the election.38
Unlike the pre-election case in which a successful suit prevents the defend-
ants from taking office, the post-election case 34 allows those illegally in office to
on S. 505 before the Subcommittee of Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
32. When Title I was first proposed by Senator McClellan as an amendment to
the remainder of the bill, it provided for civil enforcement of Title I rights through
suits by the Secretary of Labor. See § 103 of the McClellan Amendment, 105 Cora. R1e.
6476 (1959). The Kuchel Amendment (enacted as § 102) permitted individual suits by
union members. When Senator Kuchel introduced this amendment, he stated, "Here is
one of the major changes in the proposal. The Amendment of the Senator from Arkansas
provided that the Secretary of Labor might, on behalf of the injured or aggrieved member,
have the right to litigate the alleged grievance and to seek an injunction or other relief.
We believe that giving this type of right to the aggrieved employee member himself
is in the interest of justice." 105 CoxG. ZEc. 6720 (1959).
33. Also, the Secretary of Labor is a political figure who informally settles bar-
gaining disputes between unions and employers. If he finds himself investigating the
election of union officers and at the same time participating with those officers in the
collective bargaining process, neither his statutory duty under § 402 of the LMRDA nor
his bargaining responsibility will be fulfilled.
34. Throughout this Note a distinction is made between post-election and pre-election
suits. The statute itself implies that this distinction is indispensable in the interpretation
of its jurisdictional provisions. The third sentence in § 403 makes the remedy provided In
Title IV exclusive for challenging an election "already conducted." Such a suit is obviously
different from the suit described by the second sentence in § 403: "rights ... with respect
to elections prior to the conduct thereof." 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp, V,
1964).
Not only do both the statutory language and the legislative history indicate that
different fora and different procedures might be available in a pre-election as opposed
to a post-election suit, but this distinction also existed in state law regulating union
elections prior to the enactment of LMRDA. In this state law, against which Title IV
was enacted, "the willingness of the courts to intervene, the form of the remedy provided,
and the effectiveness of judicial intervention" depended upon whether the suit was brought
before the election had taken place. Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70
YALE L.J. 1221, 1244 (1961).
Most cases may be easily classified as pre-election or post-election depending upon
the timing of judicial intervention and the remedy sought. One difficult situation arises
when plaintiff seeks initially to enjoin an election but the court does not consider the
case until after the election has been held. For example, the plaintiff may lose his right
to a temporary injunction by failing to post the bond which is a condition precedent to
the injunction; and the election may take place before the case is heard on the merit.,
See Gammon v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
Also, the district court may deny the temporary injunction. The election may take place,
and then in a subsequent hearing the court may discover violations of the Act. See Ma-
mula v. United Steelworkers of America, 304 F.2d 108 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 823 (1963). The only relief which the court can grant in these cases is to set aside
the election and order a new one to take place, since the motion for an injunction has
obviously become moot by the time the court hears the case. See Colpo v. Highway
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enjoy its benefits during the period of litigation.35 The length of time required
to obtain post-election relief under the statute makes this disadvantage espe-
dally serious. In one case, for example, the challenged election took place De-
cember 10, 1960.36 On January 12, 1963 the district court held that the com-
plaining union member had been unlawfully excluded from running for office.
By that time the defendants had controlled the union for almost the entire term
to which they were illegally elected. 37
This extensive delay results partly from the procedural requirements which
the statute imposes upon the union member seeking post-election relief. Before
filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, he must have exhausted all the
remedies available within the union, or he must have pursued them for three
months without receiving a final decision.3 8 The Secretary of Labor then has
sixty days to investigate the allegations and to bring suit if he finds probable
cause to believe a violation has occurred.39 If the Secretary discovers violations
not alleged by the complaining union member, a second round of exhaustion
may be required before suit can be brought on the additional matters.4 0 Once
Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 305 F.2d 362 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied 371 U.S. 890
(1962). The court should treat these cases as post-election suits notwithstanding the
fact that the complaint was filed prior to the election and the complainant sought
initially to enjoin the election. On the other hand a suit ought to be classified as pre-
election where plaintiff seeks judicial aid to prevent irregularities from occurring in any
part of the election process. This classification would, for example, apply to a suit to
impound ballots already cast to prevent irregularities in the counting process. See
Beckman v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 314 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963).
35. Section 402(a) provides that the "challenged election shall be presumed valid
pending a final decision thereon." 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482 (a) (Supp. V, 1964).
36. Goldberg v. Amarillo General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local 577,
214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
37. The statute requires local unions to conduct elections once every three years,
and internationals are required to conduct them every five years. 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 481(b), (c) (Supp. V, 1964).
38. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (2) (Supp. V, 1964). Congress described
the purpose of the exhaustion provisions as being the preservation of "a maximum
amount of independence and self-government by giving every international union the
opportunity to correct improper local elections." S. ReP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
21 (1959). The courts have not yet had an opportunity to indicate how strictly the
exhaustion requirement would be enforced in the context of a complaint filed uith the
Secretary of Labor under Title IV. The one district court which considered this question
in any detail concluded that exhaustion would not be required where the internal com-
plaint was to be heard by those very people against whom the complaint was to be made.
Wirtz v. Local 125, Int'l Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590, 595 (N.D. Ohio 194).
39. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (Supp. V, 1964). In Wirtz v. Local
611, Int'l Hod Carriers, 229 F. Supp. 230 (D. Conn. 1964), the court held that where
the Secretary waited 62 days because the 60th day was a Sunday and the 61st day was
Veterans Day, when the clerles office was closed, the suit was timely.
40. Even if no complaint at all is filed by a union member, the Secretary of Labor
has the authority to conduct an investigation of a union election and to issue a subpoena
duces tecum in connection with such an investigation. Wirtz v. Local 191, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 321 F2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963); Wirntz v. Local 125, Int'l Hod Carriers, 231 F.
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the Secretary files his complaint, traditional delaying tactics in pre-trial dis-
covery,41 trial, and appeal may be utilized for delay by union officers.
The length of time involved in this process may preclude the relief to which
the union member is entitled. The terms of those officers whose election is be-
ing challenged may have expired since terms of local officers are limited to
three years.4 2 In such cases intervening elections may have been conducted,
Even if the terms have not expired, it is unclear whether the officers elected in
an election ordered by the court serve the remainder of the term begun by
those illegally in office, or whether the new officers are entitled to serve for a
full term.
Another disadvantage of post-election relief is that the LMRDA imposes
greater burdens upon the plaintiff.43 For example, section 402(c) permits a
court to set aside an election only if it can be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that a violation of Title IV "may have affected the outcome."4 4 Evi-
dence to demonstrate that the outcome of the election has been affected may
be very difficult for a non-officer plaintiff to obtain.45 And for some violations,
Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964). This authority comes from § 601(a) of the LMRDA, a
general investigatory provision. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. V, 1964). A
fortiori the Secretary can investigate matters not alleged in the union member's con-
plaint as well as those specifically alleged. However, authorization to investigate is not
authorization to litigate. This raises the question of whether the Secretary may include
in the complaint he files with the district court matters which his investigation uncovered
but which the union member never alleged. One district court permitted the Secretary
to include in his complaint matters not alleged by the union member, Goldberg v. Trico
Workers Union, 53 L.R.R.M. 2875 (W.D.N.Y. 1963), concluding that to require duplica-
tion of exhaustion would seriously impair the effectiveness of the statutory scheme. A
second court, however, has reached a contrary result in a slightly different case. Wirtz v.
Local 125, Int'1 Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
41. Goldberg v. District Lodge 70, I.A.M., 51 L.R.R.M. 2036 (D. Kan. 1962). But
cf. Wirtz v. Local 30, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 34 F.R.D. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),
holding that the Secretary of Labor does not have to appear personally for a deposition,
absent a showing of injustice.
42. See note 37, supra.
43. A study by Professor Summers of pre-LMRDA decisions in union election cases
in the New York State courts indicates that this greater burden inheres in the nature of
post-election relief. If a court grants post-election relief, it imposes upon the union
not only the costs of a new election, but more importantly, the internal disruption
caused by the lack of legitimatized leadership and the turmoil of another and more
bitter campaign.
Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221, 1244-45 (1961).
44. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (Supp. V, 1964). More than 25 per
cent of the complaints filed with the Secretary of Labor during the fourth year of the
Act's operation were dismissed for failing to satisfy this test. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Swni-
mary of Operations 1964, Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 6 (1964).
45. For example, if plaintiff cannot observe the ballot box continuously, he may
find it exceedingly difficult to prove that it has been stuffed. Even if the tally indicated
that 1200 votes had been cast and that plaintiff was defeated by a vote of 800 to 400
in a union with a total membership of 2500, and plaintiff can show that 250 ballots cast
1288 [Vol, 74: I=8
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it will be difficult, if not impossible, to show that the election would have been
affected, for example, by the use of union money to promote an individual's
candidacy. 40 Even if the election outcome would not have been different, an
aggrieved plaintiff might deserve relief. An illegally excluded candidate who
can prove only minority support, may want to show that there is a function-
ing minority which is part of the union's political structure.47 Denying his
relief hinders the gradual development of opposition parties. 48
The relative ineffectiveness of post-election relief did not escape congression-
al notice 4 9 and Congress dearly intended to preserve pre-election relief, at
least in state courts. When the bill was introduced in the Senate, it provided
that post-election suits brought by the Secretary would be the exclusive method
of enforcing an individual's rights.'0 Neither state nor federal courts would
have jurisdiction to give any pre-election relief. Opponents of this bill argued
that though its purpose was to increase the protection available to union mem-
bers, the bill would actually reduce protection since pre-election remedies
were the only effective ones, and these could be obtained under existing state
law but not under the bill.51 As a result the bill was amended to allow at least
in his favor were destroyed, this may not support an inference that 150 other ballots
were similarly disposed of, thus affecting the election. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 11, Int'l
Hod Carriers, 211 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa. 1962), for a case illustrating the difficulties
of proof facing a plaintiff.
46. 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (Supp. V, 1964).
47. See Stewart, J., concurring in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 146, n. 7
(1964). If the vote count gives the majority party 800 votes and the dissenters 200, in
a union with a membership of 1500, the dissenters will have no remedy even if 500 of
their votes were not counted. However this would prevent an opposition party front
showing its true strength in one election which could reduce its chances of prevailing in
subsequent elections.
48. There are still other difficulties with the post-election remedy which may prevent
effective relief in certain cases. Suppose, for example, the Secretary can show that the
votes were miscounted and that the candidate who had been declared the loser had in
fact received a majority of votes. The Secretary should be able to certify tie candidate
who received the greatest number of votes as the winner. However, the statute does not
speak of such a remedy; it only provides that the old election shall be set aside and a new
one conducted. 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (Supp. V, 1964).
49. See, e.g., the statement of Professor Cox in referring to pre-election remedies
as "often more effective than a challenge to the validity of an election after it has been
held." Hearings on S.505 before the Subcommittee of Labor of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1959).
50. The only remedies provided by the Elections Title (Title IV as enacted) in-
volved the Secretary of Labor. Also the original bill had nothing equivalent to the bill
of rights in Title I of the LMRDA as enacted. See text of S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959).
51. See, e.g., ACLU, A LABOR UION "BIL OF RIG S" - DE.ocpncY IN Lsnon
U oioNs - THE KENxEDY-IvEs BaL. (Sept., 1958); see also statements of Professor
Summers, Hearings on Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Ielifare
594, 613, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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some of the issues which could be raised by the Secretary in post-election suits
to be raised by individuals in state pre-election suits.2
The Court, in Calhoon, completely ignored these indications that Congress
did not intend to foreclose pre-election remedies. Instead when the majority
denied plaintiff pre-election relief it interpreted the inconclusive words of the
statute to thwart its overriding purpose, and at least in the case of pre-election
state remedies removed a protection which existed before the Act.53 The cor-
rect decision would have been to require the district court to determine the
merits of the case before the union's election. Jurisdiction of the federal district
court could have been founded either upon a construction of the remedial pro-
visions of Title IV to allow pre-election suits, or a broader construction of the
substantive rights in Title I, which clearly does allow pre-election suits.
Neither the lack of a specific pre-election provision, nor the existence of
post-election administrative procedures necessarily bars the federal courts' pre-
election jurisdiction to enforce Title IV rights. 28 U.S.C. section 1337, pro-
viding that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or
proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or
protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies,"
52. The second sentence of what is now § 403 of the LMRDA was added to provide,
"existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organiza-
tion with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the
provisions of this title." 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. V, 1964). See, e.g.,
Beiso v. Robilotto, 26 Misc. 2d 137, 212 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1960), Mamula v. United
Steelworkers of America, 409 Pa. 175 (1962), sustaining state court jurisdiction in pre-
election suits. The Secretary's jurisdiction was made exclusive only in post-election
cases. See the third sentence of § 403 set out at note 12 supra. The legislative history in-
dicates that the post-election remedy through the Secretary excluded only other post-
election suits and not pre-election suits. The Senate report stated, "since the bill provides
an effective and expeditious remedy for overthrowing an improperly held election and
holding a new election, the federal remedy is made the sole remedy and private litigation
would be precluded." S. REp. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).
53. Although the Court's language in Calhoon was confined to the jurisdiction of
iederal courts, its rationale would apply equally to bar the pre-election jurisdiction of
state courts as well as federal courts where the conduct alleged arguably violated Title
IV. In fact the only case cited by the majority in support for its rationale, San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), cited at 379 U.S. 140, was a
case which had arisen in the state courts. Admittedly the pre-election jurisdiction of
the state courts is preserved by Title IV which contains a clause designed to save such
jurisdiction. See note 52 supra. However, there have been situations in which the Court
has denied a privately invoked judicial remedy notwithstanding the existence of a savings
clause. See, e.g., Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
The reasons which led the Court in Abilene to read the savings clause out of the statute were
precisely the same which motivated the decision in Calhoon, i.e. a belief that the over-
riding purpose behind the statute would be frustrated by permitting private judicial
remedies. Therefore in order to be consistent with Calhoon the Court would also have
to bar state court jurisdiction.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958).
1290 [Vol, 74: 1282
UNION ELECTIONS
creates jurisdiction in the federal courts to enforce the substantive rights and
duties created by a federal statute regulating commerce:m Section 1337 has
been used frequently as the basis for federal court jurisdiction when Congress
has made no explicit provision for a private judicial remedy, even when there
existed an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute generally. 0
For example, in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loconotive Fircmen and Engi-
neers 57 the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction rs of a federal district
court in a private suit to enforce a right created by the Railway Labor Act,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific authorizing provision, and notwith-
standing the existence of the National Mediation Board. Similarly in Fitzgerald
v. Pan American World Airways,59 the Second Circuit allowed the plaintiff
to allege damages caused by the discrimination of an airline in violation of the
Civil Aeronautics Act, although Congress entrusted primary enforcement to
the C.A.B. and did not specifically provide for individual suits.'0 In both cases
55. HART & VEcHsLEP, THE FEaE. COURTS AND TE FEDERAL SYsTmM1 730-32
(1953). The congressional declaration of findings, purposes, and policy makes it clear
that the LM-RDA is an act of Congress regulating commerce. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. V, 1964). See ]cKeon v. Highway Drivers & Helpers Local
107, 223 F. Supp. 341 (D. Del 1963); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
56. In addition to the cases discussed in the text which follows, see St. Louis L M.
& S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908) (allowing private damage actions to employees
injured by railroad's using equipment violating the Safety Appliance Act); Roosevelt
Field v. Town of North Hempsted, 84 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (permitting a
private suit to enjoin a water tower allegedly interfering with an airport); Reitmeister
v. Reitmeister, 162 F2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (allowing civil actions for publishing
telephone messages in violation of the duty imposed by the Communication Act of 1934) ;
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 591 (1946) (permitting private suits to enjoin the
interference by a state with rights granted by the National Labor Relations Act) ; Serio
v. Liss, 300 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1961); Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35
F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929). For a general discussion see Bunn, The National Law of Unfair
Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987 (1949) ; Note, Federal Turisdiction in Suits For Dam-
ages Under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 CoLun. L Rzv. 1090 (1948).
57. 323 U.S. 210 (1944). Although Tunstall was a race discrimination case, the duty
of fair representation has been sustained in economic discrimination cases under both
the Railway Labor Act and Labor Management Relations Act. See, e.g., Ford Co. Y.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
58. There has been a great deal of discussion as to whether the problem in these
cases is one of jurisdiction or one of implying a cause of action. The Supreme Court
has strongly urged the use of language which indicates the latter approach. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). However, the lower federal courts have resisted. See, e.g.,
district court opinion in Harvey v. Calhoon, 221 F. Supp. 545, 550 (1963); Crawford v.
Pituch, 91 F. Supp. 626 (,V.D. Pa. 1950). See Note, Implying Chil Remtdies From
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 285, 289 (1963), concluding that this
distinction is largely formalistic. Also the Supreme Court in Calhoon v. Harvey indicated
that the distinction wasf irrelevant, 379 U.S. at 13. This Note adopts the terminology of
jurisdiction to grant relief which hopefully incorporates both approaches.
59. 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
60. Jurisdiction was sustained under either 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958) and 23 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1958), the general "arising under" grant. The only difference between the twve
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the administrative agency could not grant the relief requested, and therefore
the judicial remedy did not interfere with the agencies' powers or functions.,"
In Calhoon, also, the Secretary was not authorized to grant the pre-election
relief requested.62 And in Calhoon, too, granting the private remedy would not
interfere with the Secretary's function.63 Section 1337 would have been appro-
priately applied in that case.64
Nothing in the LMRDA's language or legislative history prevents the use
of section 1337 to enforce Title IV rights. Congress did not consider the ques-
tion of federal pre-election jurisdiction to enforce Title IV rights generally.06
It has been argued, however, that since Congress specifically granted jurisdic-
tion in section 401 (c) when an individual member sues to force distribution of
provisions with regard to a statute regulating commerce is that § 1331, unlike § 1337, re-
quires $10,000 as a jurisdictional amount. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60 [8.-3], at 627
(2d ed. 1959).
61. Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S, 246
(1951), denying a private remedy because it would interfere with the administratvic pro-
cedures established by Congress. See generally Note, Inplying Civil Remedies Fro in
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. Rnv. 285, 291 (1963).
62. A union member cannot go to the Secretary of Labor until the election has
been conducted. See note 14 upro.
63. See the discussion of the Secretary's function supra notes 29-33 and accompanying
text.
64. Admittedly the decision in Calhoon, excluding pre-election remedies under Title
IV, is consistent with prior decisions of the majority of the lower federal courts which
considered this question. See, e.g., Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 205 F.
Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Fogle v. United Steelworkers of America, 230 F. Supp.
797 (W.D. Pa. 1964); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 201 F. Supp. 307
(D. Del. 1961); Johnson v. San Diego Waiters & Bartenders Union Local 500, 190 F.
Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961) ; Boling v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp, 18
(E.D. Tenn. 1963); Byrd v. Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1960); dictum in Gam-
mon v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ga. 1961) (dictum);
but cf. the decision of the Second Circuit in Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486, 490 (1963),
leaving the question open. Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Calloon, 379 U.S. 146,
concluded that, "As to the federal courts, it is certainly arguable that recourse through
the Secretary of Labor is the exclusive remedy only after the election has been held."
Also in McKeon v. Highway Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 223 F. Supp. 341 (D. Del,
1963), the court concluded that since the Secretary of Labor did not have jurisdiction to
bring a suit to compel the election of the office in question, the private judicial remedles
were appropriate under § 1337 notwithstanding the absence of a specific congressional
authorization in the LMRDA for such suits. However, of the cases cited in this footnote
which rejected jurisdiction, only two of these mentioned § 1337 in their opinions,
65. It has been argued that § 603(a) providing that, "Except as explicitly provided
to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall take away any right or bar any remedy to
members of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal law or law of
any State," 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. V, 1964), authorizes federal
jurisdiction. See McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 223 F. Supp.
341, 344 (D. Del. 1963); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 201
F. Supp. 307, 313 (D. Del. 1961). However § 603(a) was actually intended to be only a
general anti-pre-emption provision and not a source of new rights. See DeVeau v. Bralsted,
363 U.S. 144 (1959).
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campaign literature,6 it meant to exclude jurisdiction in all other cases. " This
argument has no support in the legislative history, which indicates that section
401(c) was drafted separately and was added as an amendment to the original
bill during debate in the Senate without consideration of the remedies to en-
force other Title IV rights.68 Since there is no indication that Congress con-
sidered the right to distribute campaign literature superior to other Title IV
rights,69 section 401(c) ought not prevent giving equally effective remedies to
more important rights through application of section 1337.10
The use of section 1337 is also required in order to avoid the anomaly that
federal courts would not be able effectively to enforce Title IV rights, but state
courts would. Congress preserved pre-existing state court jurisdiction to hear
pre-election cases in the second sentence of section 403 of the Act.71 Although
the words of the section seem to require the application of state substantive
law, the legislative history makes clear that this section was meant only to
maintain the state courts as fora, and not to dictate the state courts' choice of
applicable law.72 A consideration of the possible alternatives seems to compel
the application of the Title IV provisions.
A state court could either: (1) apply state substantive law without regard
to the union constitution or the LMRDA; (2) enforce the union constitution
according to state law, but still without regard to the LMRDA; (3) enforce
union constitutional provisions if they are not inconsistent with the LMRDA,73
66. 73 Stat 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (Supp. V. 1964).
67. The Court seems to accept this argument in Caihoon, 379 U.S. at 140.
68. 105 Conn. R. 6727-29 (1959). The language of § 401(c) also indicates that
it may have been added to insure standing rather than jurisdiction.
69. See Summers, Pre-Emption and the Labor Reform Act - Dual Rights and
Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 137 (1961).
70. Given the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce the federal substantive
rights created by Title IV of the LMRDA, clearly a court can issue an injunction as an
appropriate remedy. "It is well settled that when legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides for a right to sue for such an invasion, federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 634
(1946). For cases holding an injunction appropriate where jurisdiction was founded under
. 1337, see Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) ; AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
71. See note 52, m.pra.
72. "The central purpose of the second sentence of Section 403 was to keep available
prompt pre-election remedies, not to preserve state substantive law." Summers, Pre-emption
and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 OHio ST. L.J. 119, 137 (1961).
This conclusion accords with the intent of those responsible for the language of § 403 (as
enacted) to preserve only the pre-election jurisdiction of the state courts and not state
substantive law. See note 51 supra. See also the dictum of Air. Justice Frankfurter in
DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 156 (1960), that § 403 is an "express provision ex-
cluding the operation of state law."
73. This third source of law has been incorporated by reference into the federal
rights created by Title IV. The last sentence of § 401(e) provides, "the election shall be
conducted in accordance with the constitution and bylaws of such organization insofar
as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this title." 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 481(e) (Supp. V, 1964).
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or (4) enforce the entire range of Title IV rights. The first possibility con-
flicts with Congress' desire to replace the unions' diverse obligations under state
laws with a uniform federal obligation.7 4 The second possibility must be re-
jected because it leads to a possible conflict between duties imposed by state
and federal law.15 For example, a union constitution may require the election
of officers by a show of hands in violation of the LMRDA's secret ballot pro-
visions." If the union follows its constitution in violation of federal law, the
election may be set aside in a post-election suit. If the union plans to conduct
an election by secret ballot in violation of its constitution, the election may be
enjoined by the state court. The third possibility leaves a union member with
less protection than he had before the enactment of the LMRDA, since before
the Act state courts often went beyond the provisions of the union constitution
and bylaws in granting effective pre-election relief.77 Moreover, a union could
avoid the law completely by simply amending its constitution and bylaws. Only
the fourth possibility is consistent with the general congressional intent.7 8 Un-
like the other choices, it imposes uniform obligations upon the union adequate
74. The first sentence of § 403 provides that, "No labor organization shall be re-
quired by law to conduct elections of officers with greater frequency or in a different
form or manner than is required by its own constitution or bylaws, except as otherwise
provided by this title." 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 483 (Supp. V, 1964). The
Committee Report in the Senate explained the inclusion of this sentence in the following
manner:
There is great need for uniformity in the laws governing union elections. International
and national unions operate in many States. It would be confusing, unduly burden-
some, often impossible for them to comply with a variety of election laws. The same
considerations apply, with somewhat lesser force, to local unions, a considerable
number of which function in several States. Also, the burden of checking com-
pliance will fall upon the international union. It is easier to enforce one uniform
rule than a crazy quilt of state legislation and court decisions. Ill-considered State
laws would interfere with the national labor policy. Too stringent laws would
handicap unions in dealing with employers. Too frequent elections may keep a union
in a state of turmoil and could result in instability in collective bargaining relation-
ships with employers.
SENATE REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1959).
75. For a detailed analysis of the problem of determining when federal law has
pre-empted state law in the labor field with particular emphasis upon the conflicting
duties imposed by federal and state law, see Wellington, Labor and the Federal Syslcn,
26 U. Cm. L. REv. 542 (1959).
76. A secret ballot is required for all local and international elections. 73 Stat. 532
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a), (b) (Supp. V, 1964). For the definition of a secret ballot
see 73 Stat. 521 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 402(k) (Supp. V, 1964).
77. See, e.g., Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Di Buect v.
Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Sibilia v. Western Elec.
Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A.2d 251, 253 (1948). See generally Summers,
$idicial Regulation of Union Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221, 1249 (1961).
78. The argument that different state courts will construe these federal rights in
different ways is not particularly troublesome. The United States Supreme Court may




to protect the individual members. If a state court is to enforce the entire range
of Title IV rights before the election, there is no justification for preventing a
- federal court from enforcing them, especially since the federal courts are the
"primary [fora] for the vindication of federal rights."70
Even if the Calhoon Court was not willing to use section 1337, it could have
sustained federal pre-election jurisdiction by finding that plaintiff alleged a
Title I violation. Since there is no reason to allow the Secretary's post-election
functions to limit pre-election relief,80 the Court could have construed Title I
broadly in order to make the "equal right... to nominate" 8' effective. To make
this right effective, though, it is absolutely necessary that eligibility require-
ments be considered.82 For example, in Calhoon itself, although all members
could nominate, the limitation on candidacy made many of the nominations
useless. Under Calhoon, a union could violate Title I only by excluding a class
of members from going through the physical act of nominating.1s But the
union's motivation for preventing a class from nominating would be to exclude
79. HRT & WCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEnERAL SvsTrum 727 (1953).
This anomaly is underscored by the fact that state courts would be enforcing these federal
rights and federal courts could only provide the shelter of a federal forum if diversity
existed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Mamula v. Local 1211 United Steelworkers of America,
205 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Byrd v. Archer, 45 LThRM. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
Of course Congress is partially to blame because of its sloppy draftsmanship. Never-
theless the Court should not reach such an anomalous result unless the words of the
statute dearly require it.
80. See notes 29-33 s'upra and accompanying text.
81. See note 11 supra.
82. "The right to nominate can be infringed by restrictions on eligibility for office
as well as by rules dealing directly with the right to nominate." Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 337 F.2d
216, 218 (2d Cir. 1964). See also the Second Circuit's opinion in Harvey v. Calhoon,
324 F.2d 486 (1963). Unlike the Second Circuit, most lower courts refused to con-
sider eligibility requirements in a suit by a union member under Title I. Ifamula
v. Local 1211, United Steelworkers of America, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962); Mamula
v. United Steelworkers of America, 205 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Colpo v. High-
way Truck Drivers Local 107, 201 F. Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1961); Johnson v. San Diego
Waiters & Bartenders Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Gammon v. Interm--
tional Ass'n of Machinists, 199 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ga. 1961); Jackson v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); Boling v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Sanders v. Local 559, 54 L.ILRM.
2234 (W.D. Ky. 1963); Byrd v. Archer, 45 L.PR.RM. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1959). The re-
markable thing about these cases is that the basis for dismissal in almost all of them
was that Title I did not give a right of action to the nominee but only to the member
who made the nomination. Even if the courts were correct in insisting upon this formal
requirement, it should be easily satisfied if the nominator initiates a separate suit or if
the nominee joins the nominator. 3 Moore, FmRL PRAcricz, ff 20.05 (2d ed. 1964).
However, for some reason plaintiffs' lawyers have been very slow to pursue either of
these courses.
83. Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Calhsooni rejected the majority's
interpretation, pointing out that under this view no member could claim a violation of
his right to nominate if the union issued a regulation that only the incumbent officers
were eligible for office. 379 U.S. at 143.
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that class' nominees. The union could easily avoid Calhoon by allowing every-
one to nominate, but by refusing to put certain nominees on the ballot, or by
disqualifying them through the application of unreasonable eligibility require-
ments.84 In short, unless eligibility requirements are considered relevant to a
Title I claim, the "equal right... to nominate" disappears.85
On both the Title I and Title IV questions Calhoon v. Harvey was wrong.
However, the responsibility for the decision must be shared by the legislature.
Congress superimposed, without reconciling, two titles, which overlapped in
substantive rights and differed in schemes of enforcement. Yet the final respon-
sibility must rest with the courts, which have an obligation to construe the
statute in accordance with its major purpose. The Calhoon Court failed to meet
this obligation.
ALLAN J. ToPoL*
84. Under Calhoon the excluded class has not been deprived of Title I rights since
all members have an equal right to nominate the majority's candidates.
85. This Note does not consider which eligibility requirements are unreasonable. In
Calhoon itself Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Douglas accepted the broad interpretation
of Title I to include eligibility requirements. However, Justices Stewart and Harlan
concluded that the restrictions drawn in question were not unreasonable. 379 U.S. at 146.
*LL.B. 1965, Yale University.
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